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Abstract
The protection system for LHC beam operation is com-
posed of ’client systems’ that may request beam dumps,
of a beam interlock system that transmits the requests and
of a beam dumping system that extracts the beams to the
beam dump blocks. The various players involved in beam
interlocking will be presented, and the core systems that
are required before beam operation may start will be high-
lighted. Possibilities to stage some of the systems during
the commissioning phase will be discussed. Diagnostics
and controls requirements will be presented.
INTRODUCTION
Key parameters for machine protection are the beam en-
ergy, beam intensity and beam emittance that influence the
stored energy and energy density, the minimum β ∗ that in-
fluences collimation and failures and finally the beam in-
tensity from the SPS that influences the stored energy at in-
jection. The stored energy (density) alone is not the whole
story, since the failure mechanisms play also an important
role for damages through impact angles and time constants.
Safe beams
The TT40 damage test presented by V. Kain at Cha-
monix 2005 [1] indicates that the melting point of Copper
is reached at the peak of the shower for an impacting beam
intensity of 2.5 × 1012 protons, see Figure 1. This result
is valid for an impact orthogonal to the target surface. The
test results agree with estimates based on FLUKA simula-
tions.
Based on those results the MPWG has adopted for the
LHC a limit for the safe beams 450 GeV of 1012 protons
with nominal emittance.
FLUKA simulations indicate that the peak energy den-
sity in the shower scales with 1/σ, with σ the r.m.s. beam
size. The energy dependance of the peak energy density
that is relevant for damage scales with E1.7beam, this scaling
includes the effect of the emittance reduction with energy.
Based on this scaling law the damage limit at 7 TeV cor-
responds to 1% of the damage limit at 0.45 TeV. Scaling
the safe beam limit given above to 7 TeV yields therefore a
limit for safe beams of 1010 protons at 7 TeV.
The pilot bunch with nominal emittance is therefore
close to the damage limit (within a factor 2-4). A pilot
bunch with a reduced emittance of ε∗ = 1 μm is therefore
at the damage limit!
Figure 1: Damage due to beam impact on a Cu plate near
the maximum of the shower from a 450 GeV proton beam.
The four impacts with different intensity are marked A,B,C
and D. The beam intensities are indicated.
The present recommendation of the MPWG is to con-
sider that for a nominal emittance, a pilot should be safe at
7 TeV. However
• the safety margin for some failure scenarios is mar-
ginal,
• there are uncertainties in scaling the simulation,
• the damage levels of materials other than Cu are not
(yet) well known,
therefore some protection must be available from the start
at 7 TeV even for a pilot bunch, in particular because oper-
ation with low intensity expected to last for a short time.
It is important to note that the damage limit also depends
on the failure mode and on the beam impact angle which
makes the picture even more complicated.
MACHINE PROTECTION
COMMISSIONING
The client inputs to the Beam Interlock System that are
required for machine protection as a function of the ma-
chine commissioning stage are presented in Figures 2 and 3
for injection and top energy. The color coding of the tables
is:
• Grey : input is not required
• Green : input is not required, but expected to be oper-
ational or in a commissioning / test phase.
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Figure 2: Table of required interlock clients as a function
of the machine commissioning stage for injection.
• Red : no beam operation without this input.
For machine protection, the relevant phases are:
• First pilot bunch.
• Beam of 1012 protons.
• 43 bunches.
• 156 bunches.
• 936 bunches (75 ns).
From the two figures it is clear that state transitions of the
machine protection system appear during commissioning
for:
• pilot bunch ramp to 7 TeV : a large fraction of inputs
required
• 43 bunch operation ramp to 7 TeV : majority of inputs
required
• injection for 156 bunch operation : majority of inputs
required
Although the majority of interlock systems must be op-
erational for 43 bunch operation at 7 TeV, the required
safety level or complexity is by far not the same as for
2808 bunches. The collimation system is a good exam-
ple, where only a subset of collimators is required during
initial stages [2]. This table is clearly not cast in stone. It is
expected to evolute until the LHC starts up.
Software components
Requirements on software components are shown in Fig-
ures 4 and 5 for injection and top energy. Again it is clear
that constraints and requirements are not the same for a pi-
lot bunch and for 43 bunches or even for 2808 bunches.
Initially the SW component core must be available, with
Figure 3: Table of required interlock clients as a function
of the machine commissioning stage for 7 TeV.
Figure 4: Table of required ’safety’ software components
as a function of the machine commissioning stage for in-
jection.
a functionality that is a adapted to a given commissioning
stage. The Software Interlock System itself hides a large
system, with a core to transmit interlocks and a long list of
clients: this a an interlock system of its own. A first version
of this system is expected to be operational at the SPS for
the 2006 machine startup (CNGS commissioning).
Interlock settings
A large effort is put into building a BIS with very high
safety standard of SIL3-4. But many interlocks depend on
reference and tolerance settings. Some of those settings
must be adjustable during operation. Changes of such set-
tings MUST be protected by adequate access control. An
uncontrolled modification can be equivalent to MASKING
the corresponding interlock.
Front-end frameworks like FESA are presently open and
very easy to access, and settings may be changed from any
WEB browser at CERN! The separation of technical and
general purpose network has improved the situation some-
what but not sufficiently. The development of systems like
Figure 5: Table of required ’safety’ software components as
a function of the machine commissioning stage for 7 TeV.
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MCS (Management of Critical Settings) to provide (rea-
sonably) safe and controlled access to critical interlock set-
tings is essential for safe operation of the LHC machine
protection system.
First pilot at 450 GeV
From a pure DAMAGE protection point of view there is
no need of the BIS and its clients for the first injections.
Only an interlock on the SPS beam intensity is required.
Some key inputs of the beam interlock system will be
tested and ready to go before first beam in the LHC: the
Beam Interlock System and some of the key beam inter-
lock clients (Vacuum, Access, Powering interlock system,
Dump system, critical BLMs, Experiments) that are not
maskable. Those inputs will be active already for the first
injections.
First pilot at 7 TeV
The pilot bunch being at the edge of the damage limit
at 7 TeV, the BIS must provide some protection even for
a pilot, thus requiring a significant number of inputs. In
particular a minimal collimation (primary collimator and
absorber) with rough positions must be in place [2]. Beam
loss monitors around the collimators must be operational.
Orbit control must be available for the TCDQ, since an
asynchronous beam dump is possibly the worst event for
a pilot (the probability to hit the pilot is of course not very
high).
43 bunches
With 43 bunches the stored energy reaches a level that
is comparable to what is accelerated routinely in the SPS
since many years, but which also requires significant in-
terlocking. At the LHC the aim is to reach such stored
energy levels in a short time. The SPS experience shows
that one can provoke damage with such beams and at the
LHC the price to pay is larger: this is therefore a natural
stage where the machine protection system must be in an
advanced stage of commissioning proportionally more ad-
vanced than beam operation. Systems that may not be
required at this stage (to be studied): RF and damper in-
terlocks, fast beam current decay and fast position change
monitors.
Ions
The ion beams will profit from a MP system that is al-
ready commissioned with protons, at least up to a cer-
tain intensity, but the safe-unsafe transition must still be
analyzed with ions. It is also necessary to analyze what
sub-systems of the MP system must be at least partly re-
commissioned for ions. More detailed studies on ions are
foreseen by the MPWG in 2006.
CONCLUSION
For the first injection of a pilot bunch, no machine pro-
tection is required except a limitation of the intensity ex-
tracted from the SPS. But the BIS and all non-maskable
inputs to the BIS will be ready and (pre-)commissioned.
A beam of 1012 p constitutes the safe intensity limit for
damage protection at injection.
The damage limit at 7 TeV corresponds to 1% of the
damage limit at 450 GeV. A pilot bunch is therefore close to
the damage limit at 7 TeV. The MPWG presently assumes
that the pilot is possibly safe, but some protection will be
required (minimal collimation and BLMs) as soon as the
pilot bunch is ramped to 7 TeV.
The majority of the MPS must be operational for 43
bunches 7 TeV for 156 bunches at 450 GeV
It is essential to address the issue of how to manage crit-
ical interlock settings.
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